

communism as indicated by Holsti and Rosenau's post-cold war internationalist label, the end of the cold war is likely to further reinforce these liberal internationalist orientations in the future.

Proponents of the third popular orientation, which spans the political spectrum, recognized the increasing complexity of the world and the difficulty the United States has in affecting it, advocating a **non-internationalist** (or semi-isolationist) foreign policy. Some non-internationalists argued that the United States needed to limit its involvement to those areas of the world where it really has vital interests—primarily Western Europe and Japan. Other non-internationalists believed that the United States should de-escalate its overseas military commitments and presence, concentrating on improving its international commercial and economic position. Whatever the particular position, non-internationalists were likely to believe that the highest priority of American society and the U.S. government should be to address domestic issues and problems at home. Non-internationalists also tended to be more supportive of protection of American industry and jobs in the international political economy. Entering the 1990s, a non-internationalist orientation was most prevalent among the mass public, where isolationist sentiment has historically been strong, and might very well grow in popularity in a post-cold war world.⁴⁸

The differences between conservative internationalists, liberal internationalists, and non-internationalists are particularly noticeable in national security affairs as opposed to foreign economics. With the collapse of the foreign policy consensus over the Vietnam War, Americans differed over the nature of world politics and their prescriptions for U.S. national security policy. Thus, where conservative internationalism once reigned supreme and provided the basis for the "national security ethos" of independence, secrecy, and realpolitik that prevailed among policymakers during the 1950s and 1960s, as discussed in chapter 6, since Vietnam there have been fewer adherents of a strong national security ethos and they must operate in a domestic political climate that, with the rise of liberal internationalism and non-internationalism, is less receptive to such views.

Foreign economic policy views and the free market ethos, discussed in chapter 7, were much less affected by the Vietnam War and the collapse of the cold war consensus. Internationalists, whether cold war-oriented or post-cold war-oriented, still tend to sympathize with a free market ethos. Conservative internationalists are the most strong believers and advocates of an unregulated international political economy based on a free market. Liberal internationalists, for the most part, also believe in a market-oriented international political economy, but argue for the need for more multilateral cooperation, management, and regulation. It is the non-internationalists who are the least receptive to the free market ethos and most willing to advocate protectionism for local industry and labor. Therefore, the cold war consensus has collapsed, but the split in foreign policy beliefs is much greater in the area of national security than it is over foreign economics. This may undergo some change with the end of the cold war and the rise of economic issues to the forefront of U.S. foreign policy.

Together, the three general foreign policy orientations set the parameters of foreign policy thought in the making of U.S. foreign policy. Members of the elite

public tend to be more committed to some variant of conservative or liberal internationalism, but they usually are opposed to non-internationalism. Members of the mass public tend to be more moderate and pragmatic in their beliefs, demonstrating both liberal and conservative elements, and are more receptive to the non-internationalist view.⁴⁹ This configuration of foreign policy beliefs among different types of publics has led to some major contradictions in public opinion, especially over national security policy. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, for example, most Americans continued to be fearful and skeptical of international communism; yet they also wanted more cooperative and peaceful relations with communist countries, such as the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Likewise, most continued to believe in a strong defense; however, they remained reluctant to support uses of force that may result in American boys dying abroad. Although these contradictory views are not easily resolved, they demonstrate that the legacies of both the cold war and Vietnam War seem to have been absorbed by most Americans within their foreign policy beliefs as the United States moves beyond the cold war in the 1990s.

Political Implications

The changes in ideological and foreign policy beliefs have important political implications for the foreign policy process. What is important to understand is that the movement from cold war consensus to post-Vietnam diversity has widened the boundaries of domestic politics and political discourse in the making of U.S. foreign policy. Such changes in the ideological and foreign policy beliefs cannot be understated for the collapse of the cold war consensus has led to a post-Vietnam War era where public opinion is more volatile, political participation has become more active and diverse, the media is more likely to act independent of the government, Congress has reasserted its authority, and the president's ability to govern foreign policy has weakened and declined.

The diversity of foreign policy beliefs has led to some major fluctuations in public opinion. Where public opinion only fluctuated within a narrow range consistent with the liberal-conservative and cold war internationalist consensus during the cold war years, public opinion is much more open to greater fluctuation reflecting the breakdown of the cold war consensus. This is because, unlike the opinions of the elite public, which tend to reflect their commitment to a particular ideological and foreign policy view, members of the mass public tend to be more centrist and more non-internationalist in their views. Therefore, members of the mass public, since they do not internalize the ideological views of the elite public, are more likely to change their opinion and be open to populist appeals: sometimes they are responsive to a more conservative and cold war internationalist position while other times they are more receptive to a liberal and post-cold war internationalist position.

As William Schneider has pointed out, when a foreign policy issue gets on the political agenda and is framed in terms of security and military "strength," then the conservative internationalist views tend to win the political debate. However, if it is framed in terms of "peace," then the liberal internationalist perspective tends to prevail. "Instead of elite consensus and mass followership, what emerged